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Urbonya: Fourth Amendment Decisions

SUPREME COURT'S 1998-1999 TERM: FOURTH
AMENDMENT DECISIONS
Kathryn R.Urbonya*
JUDGE PRATT:
At this point we are going to move into the Fourth Amendment,
Supreme Court developments of last term from Professor Urbonya
followed by some commentary by Judge Raggi in this area.
PROF. URBONYA:
Before I begin, how many of you have actually worked on a
Section 1983 case involving a traffic stop? What I would like to
start with are the traffic stop cases. But I would like to begin with
Whren v. UnitedStates case,' which is an old case, just to give us a
background of where we are going. Judge Raggi is going to be the
commentator after my discussion. She had previously asked me if
I had a theme for the cases. Today I respond to her question by
stating two themes: expanding police powers and discarding the
presumption of a warrant requirement.
How often do we find a Fourth Amendment violation?' Very
rarely, the Court expanded police powers this term once again and
created a paradigm shift. I guess that sounds very academic.
Instead of asking, "Where is the warrant?" (we do not ask that
question anymore), we ask, "What does the common law have to
say?" If the common law does not answer the question, then we
look to reasonableness. I can actually say that I have seen this shift
in practice occur. I read one of the cases that is pending in the
* Kathryn R. Urbonya is a Professor of Law at William and Mary School of
Law. She is a former law clerk for United States District Judge G. Ernest
Tidwell, Atlanta, Georgia, and North Dakota Supreme Court Justice Gerald W.

Vande Walle.
' 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
2 U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. This section provides in pertinent part:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to

be seized. Id.
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Supreme Court, the Wardlow case,3 and I was surprised to see that
every single brief that was submitted talked about the common
law. I hope all of us here in this room are historians and like to
read dusty old cases, because the Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis is rooted in interpreting the common law and expanding
police powers. Let us dust off the history books, if we listen to the
Supreme Court's cornrands and start looking at the historical
roots of the Fourth Amendment.
The Whren case,4 as many of you may remember, was a traffic
stop case. The issue in Whren was about pretextual stops.5 We
have all been reading in the newspapers about racial profiling, and
many of you in the room have even been subject to it, but the
Supreme Court said the issue is not whether the officer engaged in
a pretextual traffic stop, the question is: Did the officer have a
reason to stop this particular individual for a traffic violation?6 In a
very short paragraph the Supreme Court said, if race is at issue, do
not use the Fourth Amendment, use the Equal Protection Clause.7
The only question for the Fourth Amendment is: Did the officer
have reason to believe the driver committed a traffic offense? As
many of us know, that is not only speeding, but faulty lights, or not
maintaining your lane correctly. Many reasons cause police
officers to pull us over.' Prior to the Whren case, the question was:
3

People of the State of Illinois v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, (IlI. Dec. 1998),

decided, 120 S. Ct. 673,676 (2000) (holding that police officer had reasonable
suspicion to forcibly stop a citizen in a high-crime neighborhood after ran
"headlong" after seeing police).
4 517

5 U.S.

U.S. 806 (1996).
CONST. amend. IV. This section provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized. Id.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
7 Id. (stating that "[s]ubjective intentional play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis").
8 Id. at 817. The Court acknowledged that an officer may have "probable
cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of a multitude of applicable
traffic and equipment regulations." Id. at 817 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979).
6
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What about ordering the driver out of the car? The officer stops us
under Whren for a traffic case. The next question is: What else
can the officer do? Well, the officer can order the driver out of the
car under Pennsylvaniav. Mimms.9

The idea is officer safety. Then, a couple of terms ago, the court
in Maryland v. Wilson, 0 asked what about passengers? The
Supreme Court said, you can also order the passenger out of the
car." If it is good for driver and officer safety, it is good for
passenger and officer safety.
In Ohio v. Robinette, " an issue arose after the officer stopped the
driver, gave him a warning. As the officer returned the license, he
said, "One question before you get going: Are you carrying any
illegal contraband in the car?"' 3 The question before the Supreme
Court was: once the officer concluded the traffic stop, did the
officer have to say, "The stop is now over, you are free to go?"'"
The Court decided that the officer did not have to say that. Instead
a totality of circumstances test applied.' 5 We also know from the
Schneckloth"' case, under consent doctrine, that the police officer
does not have to tell us our right to refuse the consent to the
search. 7 So, the officer can stop us, can order the driver out of the
car and can order the passenger(s) out of the car.' Once it is over,
the officer does not even have to tell us that we do not have to
consent nor does he have to tell us the traffic stop is now over. 9

9 436 U.S. 106 (1977).
1o519 U.S. 408 (1997).
" Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15.
12
13

519 U.S. 33 (1996).
Id. at 35-3 6.

I4 Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35.
15 Id. at 38. The Court explains that in view of the "'endless variations in the
facts and circumstances' implicating the Fourth Amendment, ... the proper
inquiry necessitates a consideration of 'all the circumstances surrounding the
encounter."' Id.
16 Scimeckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
17 Schnecldoth, 412 U.S. at 249 (holding that the subject's knowledge of a
right to refuse consent is a factor to be considered in determining the
voluntariness of the consent, but the subject's knowledge of a right to consent is
not a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent).
18 See, e.g., Mimms, 436 U.S. 106; Wilson, 519 U.S. 408.
1 See, e.g., Robinette, 519 U.S. 33; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
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How does this set the stage for last term's cases? Well, we also
have to include Michigan v. Long"0 , which is an older case that
dealt with searching the car and what the officer can do to search a
car.2' In Michigan v. Long, the officer was able to search the
passenger compartment of the car because the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe there was a dangerous weapon
there.22 Typically, we think of an officer searching a car after an
arrest. The idea is the officer arrests the driver and then searches
the car. How many of you have actually been arrested for a traffic
offense? Anyone here? There are no hands going up. How many
of you have gotten citations?
You have gotten lots of citations, and lots of warnings. In
the Iowa case that I have cited in my materials, Knowles v. Iowa,23
there was a state statute that authorized a police officer to search
the vehicle incident not to an arrest, but incident to a citation, and
the question was the constitutionality of the statute.2 4 In an
amazing decision, the Supreme Court found a Fourth Amendment
violation saying that the police officer could not search the car
incident to a traffic citation, and in trying to decide this case, the
Supreme Court did not look to history in this case; it just relied on
precedent. The Court relied on the "search incident to an arrest"
doctrine to say there is difference between arresting someone on
one hand and going ahead and issuing a citation on the other
hand.' The Court said the two rationales that apply to "search
incident to an arrest" just do not work in the context of a search
incident to a citation.26
First, the Supreme Court did recognize that traffic stops can
be dangerous and that officers can be subject to some kind of
danger, but the Supreme Court said, in contrast to an arrest where
there is continuing custody with this person, a traffic stop is a very
brief encounter. If the officers have reasonable suspicion to
believe that the person is armed and dangerous, then the officers
20 463

U.S. 1032 (1983).

21 Long, at 1034-35.

22 Id.at 1035.
2' 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
24 Knowles, at 114.
25Id. at 117.

Id. The Court stated: "Neither of these rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case." Id.
26
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can invoke the Terry doctrine and subject the person to a pat down
in that situation for weapons.27 The Knowles Court explained that a
traffic stop does not present that kind of danger to the officers.'
The second rationale under the search incident to an arrest
doctrine was: What about the need to preserve evidence? ' When
you arrest someone and you are about to go to the police station,
the suspect may try to destroy evidence. First of all, the offense in
this case was speeding. There is not going to be any further
evidence to worry about whether the driver is going to throw this
evidence away.3" Speeding is the offense. The Court said this was
not a facial attack to the statute, it was just looking at the particular
facts. Under these narrow facts, the search incident to arrest
doctrine does not work."
So officers cannot search our cars
incident to a traffic citation. That is all the Knowles Court decided
in this particular case.
What about property that is in the car during a traffic stop?
That is the Wyoming v. Houghton case. 2 I encourage all of you to
read that case in detail. That case dealt the property of a
passenger, an issue the Supreme Court had not previously
addressed. In that case, the officer had stopped the driver, pulled
him over for speeding and a faulty brake light, and then noticed
27d. at 117. The Court explained:

The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is
a good deal less than in a case of custodial arrest. In Robinson, we
stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer because of
the 'extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station." We recognized

that the danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest,
and its attendant proximity stress, and uncertainty, and not from the

grounds for the arrest. A routine traffic stop on the other hand I a
relatively brief encounter and is "more analogous to a so-called Terry
stop.
Id.
28
29

id.
1d. at 118.

30 Id. The Court explained: "Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and

issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
obtained." Id.
31 Id. at 119. The Court refused to extend the" 'bright line rule' to a situation
where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the
concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all:'
32 119 S. Ct.

1297 (1999).
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there was a hypodermic syringe in the driver's pocket. The officer
ordered the driver out, and went to get gloves to protect his
hands.3 As the driver was standing outside of the car, the officer
asked the driver, "Why do you have a syringe?" As the Supreme
Court says, with "refreshing candor,"34 the driver said, "for drugs."
At that point, the officer had, according to the law, probable cause
to believe there were drugs in the car. After the driver made that
admission, the officer ordered the other two passengers out of the
been sitting in the front seat.
car, two female passengers; they had
35
purse.
a
was
there
In the back seat,
The male driver and two female passengers were all outside
the car now, and the officer asked one of the female passengers in
this case, a woman named Sandra, "What is your name?" She
said, "My name is Sandra James. '36 Notice the case is Wyoming v.
Houghton.37 She lied. The officer went and opened the purse, did
not see the name "Sandra James", saw the name "Sandra
Houghton", came back and said, "I see this purse says 'Sandra
Houghton'. Is this your purse?" At that point she said, "Yes, it is
mine." The officer searched the purse again and this time found
drugs.38 So the question for the Supreme Court was: What about
the officer's ability to search that purse in the back seat for drugs?
The lower court in this case talked about the ownership, did the
officer have notice this purse did not belong to the male driver who
was stopped for drugs, and the Supreme Court refused to adopt an
ownership test for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 39 All the
officer needed was to have probable cause to believe there were
33 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.
34 id.
35 id.
36
Id.

37 119 S. Ct. 1297.
38
Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.
39
Id.at 1303. The Court explained:

Once a 'passenger's property' exception to car searches became widely
known, one would expect passenger-confederates to claim everything as
their own. And one would anticipate a bog of litigation--.... We think
[our determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment]
militate in favor of the needs of law enforcement, and against a personalprivacy interest that is ordinarily weak.
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drugs inside the car, and even though it is a purse, the officer could
go ahead and search the purse for the drugs.
One interesting line the Court drew in this case, which is
not as clear as it sounds when you read all the opinions together, is
that the officer could not search the person. The facts of the case,
however, are limited to the searching of the purse that is inside the
car.4 It could be a little confusing about the officer's ability to
search the person. Yet the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio4 ' could apply
if officers have reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and
dangerous.4 2 The Court seems to implying that officers can search
the property inside the car; but when the passengers are outside the
car, they could not be subject to a frisk.
This is an interesting line that the Court drew here.43
Another case deals with the warrantless search of a car. It is a very
short opinion: Marylandv. Dyson". It was a per curiam decision;
it is under the automobile exception of the Fourth Amendment.
The automobile exception goes back to the Carroll case', the
bootleg liquor case where the officer drove along the road trying to
stop people from transporting illegal alcohol on the road, and the
officer had probable cause to believe there was alcohol in a car in
the Carrollcase.' In this case, the officer had probable cause to
believe there were drugs in the car.47
The automobile doctrine originally asked two questions:
One, did the officer have probable cause to believe there was
contraband in the car?
And, two, were there exigent
circumstances?"s The lower court in this case, the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals, said that you have to make both findings, that
is to say, you had to have both probable cause to believe there are
40 Id. at 1302. The Court quoted Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 24-25 (1968) by
stating: "Even a limited search of the outer clothing.. .constitutes a severe,

though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id.
41 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
42 Id. at 1304. (Breyer, J., concurring).
43 See

Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999).
45 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
46 Carroll,267 U.S. at 160
47 Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014.
44

48 Id.
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drugs in the car and, also, that there are exigent circumstances.49
The Supreme Court said in a very short opinion, no, you only need
to make one finding, you only need to have probable cause to
believe there are drugs inside the car."0 A very short opinion,
Maryland v. Dyson is an example of the scope of the automobile
exception.
Another important case is Floridav. White,5 which deals
with a Florida forfeiture statute. In that case, the officers on
several occasions observed the driver use his car for drug dealing. 2
Under state forfeiture law, that car was contraband and
could be seized. The question for the Court was: Could the
officers, given all the facts in this case, seize that car in a public
place without a warrant?53 The answer to the question was yes. 4
It is a car being seized without a warrant. Why not get a
warrant? This is part of a paradigm. Justice Stevens in his dissent
said, Oh, by the way, what happened to the general rule that
warrants are presumptively required? 5 The Supreme Court had
previously said that the idea of having police officers ask a
magistrate for a warrant is impractical because the officers are
often engaged in a "competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."56 Justice Stevens in his dissent said, in this case, the
officers are engaged in the "competitive and potentially lucrative
enterprise of ferreting out crime."57 That is not the question for the
Court.58 The question for the Court was not, whether the warrant is
required, but how would we have decided this question at common
law?
Cars are a lot like ships, so, therefore, since, they are like
ships under our old cases, the Carroll case (the bootleg case), let
Dyson v. State of Maryland, 122 Md. App. 413,424 (1998).
°Dyson, 119 S. Ct. at 2014.
51 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999).
52 White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557.
51 Id. at 1560.
49
5

54 id.

55 Id. at 1561. Justice Stevens said: "Because the Fourth Amendment plainly
protects property as well as privacy and seizures as well as searches, ... I would
apply to the present case our longstanding warrant presumption." Id.
6 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
57
See White, supra, note 48, at 1563.
58

Id.
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officers go ahead and seize them. It is a five, two, two decision. I
already mentioned Justice Stevens' dissent stating that officers
should have a warrant. In this case Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer agreed to go ahead and concur on this opinion, but warned
the states, noting that just because they labeled something it
contraband did not mean everything could be subject to an
automatic seizure. 9 In this case, the Court allowed forfeiture
because the car was definitely related to the drug dealing that was
going on. But not all seizures in all situations of contraband are
going to be warrantless, according to the two judges.' Notice it is
a five, two, two decision, so there are five judges not putting any
limits on this particular case.
How does the paradigm shift also occur? It also happened
in the passenger's property case. There are a lot of defense
attorneys here, I would encourage you to look at how the Court
frames the Fourth Amendment question there. Five judges very
clearly say, the first question we have in a Fourth Amendment
analysis is, at common law, would the practice have been
unlawful? Five judges say that is the approach we should look at.
If it would have been unlawful, we stop the inquiry there, but if we
do not know from the common law, the Supreme Court said we
can do our general reasonableness kind of balancing we ask for,
looking at to see whether it is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Five judges say we should look at the
common law to determine the answer to the Fourth Amendment
question.
Another Fourth Amendment cases I want to talk about is
Minnesota v. Carter,' which dealt with the question attorneys
would call it "standing," but the Supreme Court told us not to use
the word "standing."
The question is about whether the
defendant's own rights were violated in a particular case. This
case involves three individuals. Three individuals were in an
apartment, a female and two males. An informant saw three of

59 White, 119 S Ct. at 1560. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring).
60 Id. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring).
61

Id. at 1558. (Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring).
Ct. 469 (1998).

62 119 S.
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them sitting around a table and noticed plastic bags and white
powder; and the informant told the police officer of this activity."
The police officer was able to look inside the window
because it was an apartment near the ground, and he was able to
see through the blinds of this enterprise."
Based on this
information, the officer got a warrant in this case. The question
before the Supreme Court did not deal with the leaseholder of the
apartment, it dealt with the two males that were present in the
apartment and whether their own Fourth Amendment rights were
implicated by the officer's observation. The Supreme Court said
they were not.65 The facts were that they were there for two and a
half hours, that they were engaging in this criminal enterprise, and
that they lived that Chicago, not Minnesota. This was just a
fleeting time in this apartment, and, therefore, their own Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated, not even implicated.'
The Supreme Court, once again, admonished all of us not
to refer to this as a question of standing.67 It is a question of
whether the visitor's reasonable expectation of privacy rights were
violated in this particular case, and the Supreme Court said no.
Interesting, five different votes, however, decided another
issue that is not really directly raised in this case, but tangential to
it. Justice Kennedy in his swing vote said, there is a difference,
however, between the facts of this case, (involving a criminal
enterprise, short-term, visitors who had never been in the
apartment before) and social guests. Social guests do have their
Fourth Amendment rights implicated by such conduct. With the
dissent and Justice Kennedy's vote, if you are social guests inside
someone's apartment, you do have your Fourth Amendment rights
implicated and you can go ahead and challenge it.63
63

Id. at 471-472.

4id.

6-See generally Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
66 id.

Id. at 472. The Court stated: "Central to our analysis [is] the idea that in
determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not
67

someone else') Fourth Amendment rights, the "definition of those rights is more
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than
within that of standing." Id.
68 Id. at 480-484.
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The Supreme Court never had to get to the legality in this
case of the officer peering through the window. Why? Because
those individual males who were in the apartment do not have any
Fourth Amendment rights even implicated by their presence in the
apartment, because they are not social guests.69 The Supreme
Court distinguished the prior case of Minnesota v. Olsen", which
dealt with an overnight guest, who definitely had "standing."
Now, after Minnesota v. Carter71 , a social guest has "standing." I
am not really supposed to say that: The social guest has an
expectation of privacy.'
If you are just there briefly, engaging in a criminal
enterprise, there is no ability to raise the Fourth Amendment as an
issue. That is what the Supreme Court said.
The Supreme Court, granted certiorari in October in United
States v. Bond. It is a bus case, and it is a reasonable expectation
of privacy case. You all remember the standard from Katz' about
when you have a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is that the defendant has a expectation of privacy and
has conducted his or her actions in a manner to create a subjective
expectation of privacy and the privacy is one that society
recognizes reasonable.'
This case, United States v. Bond, that the Court just granted
certiorari in, is about a passenger on a bus. The bus is stopped at a
permanent border checkpoint to check for illegal aliens on the bus.
The officer went down the bus and checked everyone. As the
officer came back up the bus, the officer started, (and this is the
technical term) "squeezing" the defendant's luggage. That's all the
information we get. Why do I say it is a technical term? That is
because many lower courts have said - another technical term - if
you "poof' somebody's luggage or "prep" somebody's luggage
and you cause the air to circulate, that is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
69

1d.at 473-474.

70 495 US 91 (1990).
71 See Carter,119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
72d.at 473.
73 167 F.3d 225 (5t Cir. 1999).
74
75

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See generally,Kaz, supra,note 71.
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Why would you "poof' somebody's luggage? So you can
get the air moving, so either the officer can smell it or a dog can
smell it. "Poofing" and "prepping" are accepted in the lower
courts, but we do not have "poofing" and "prepping" in this case.
We have squeezing, and the Fifth Circuit said that the squeezing
did not violate or implicate the Fourth Amendment because there is
76
no reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage in this manner.
The Fifth Circuit did cite a Tenth Circuit case that went the other
way on a different act. The other act was pressing both sides of a
luggage.' The way the lower courts have looked at it, I had great
entertainment reading these cases. Many of the lower courts have
asked the question: Is the luggage being touched in a manner that
would be different from the way another passenger would touch
the baggage? In a Seventh Circuit case, in which there was a
dissent, the majority in the Seventh Circuit had allowed the officer
to touch the baggage but not pull it out. A judge in this case
dissented, stating that he could not imagine -- language of the
Court - that federal judges would allow their baggage to be
manipulated, squeezed in a manner to determine what the contents
are. But stay tuned, we will find out at the end of the term whether
the squeezing is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to the bus stops we have here. That is
UnitedStates v. Bond.7"
The other case that was alluded to by Professor Schwartz
this morning was Wilson v. Layne 9 , the media case where
photographers and reporters went inside a house, and in another
case we had CNN video taping the search. The Supreme Court
said in this case, surprisingly, it did violate the Fourth Amendment
to have the media along. 0
The standard the Court used in this case was, when you
have the media along, it is not aiding the execution of a warrant,
and it gave a couple of examples of things that are probably
76

See Bond, supra,note 70 at 227.

77 See United States v. Nicholson, 144 F. 3d 632, 639

(10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the manipulation of luggage stored in an overhead luggage bin was
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
78 See Bond, supra,note 70.
79 119 S. Ct. 162 (1999).
'old. at 1699.
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permissible. It said, if you, for example, are a person whose
property has been stolen and you went along with the police
officers to identify stolen property, then you would be aiding in the
execution of a search warrant in that particular case. The Court
also mentioned that police officers could video tape themselves,
for example. Sometimes an officer may video tape for quality
control to see what is going on, but the fact the media came in this
case, the Court said did not aid in the execution, even though, as
the Court said, it may be good PR for the officers, it did not really
accept the arguments that the media were somehow going to make
the search go a little better, protect the police officer in public.
One last case pending in the Supreme Court, I think is an
incredibly important case, is Illinois v. Wardlow.8" This case is
about reasonable suspicion. An individual was in an asserted
admittedly high crime neighborhood in Chicago around noontime.
He stood on a comer, and four officers in a Caravan passed. (It is
not clear from the record whether the officers were in marked or
unmarked cars.) The first car went past the defendant, who was
standing on the comer with a white opaque bag in his hand. (We
do not know whether the officers were in uniform or not.) The
defendant saw them. Then the second car went past, followed by
the third car, and then the fourth. 3 Each car had two had two
officers. Wardlow, standing on the comer, looked at the officer
and started to run in a high crime neighborhood, and as he ran, the
fourth car started to follow him. Wardlow ran down a gangway,
and eventually Wardlow ran into the driver the fourth car.'
The officer did not identify the purpose of the stop in this
case, but immediately frisked him. The question in this case
before the Supreme Court is: Does flight alone at the site of a
police officer create reasonable suspicion or, if flight alone doesn't
create reasonable suspicion, is flight plus being in a high-crime
neighborhood enough to create reasonable suspicion?' Justice
Scalia in a prior decision had relied on an ancient source, the Bible,
stating, "the wicked fleeth where no man runneth," and concluded
8' 701
12

N.E.2d 484, (II. 1998).

Id. at 484-86.

83id.

84id.
SId at 486.
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that flight upon just seeing an officer is enough to create a
reasonable suspicion. 6 The Supreme Court decided that question
this year and held that that kind of action creates reasonable
suspicion for the stop in this case. 7

See generally,Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
87 Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). On January 12, 2000, the
Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's unprovoked flight in an area of heavy
narcotics trafficking supported reasonable suspicion that defendant in criminal
activity and justified stop. Id.
86
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